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Abstract This chapter focuses on exclusion. It reconstructs the definition of exclusion 
and its various facets by applying a set of principles that underlie economic analyses. 
The analysis reveals that many initiatives to reduce exclusion under the umbrella of 
safety nets often lead to the introduction of differentiated products in segmented 
markets that may actually contribute to the perpetuation of differentiations within a 
population. The relations between contracts, goods and services, and exclusions are 
highlighted. A typology of exclusion is described by the author with the help of a 
supply and demand analysis of services, including: voluntary exclusion, exclusion 
due to a lack of awareness, exclusion for survival, exclusion due to a lack of demand, 
and exclusion caused by “distance” such as social exclusion or poor connectivity.
Keywords Exclusion • Segmentation • Poverty • Safety nets • Development 
• Bangladesh
3.1  Introduction1
Literature on the ‘economics of exclusion’ typically addresses competition and the 
anti-trust laws of developed economies, not the ‘exclusion’ that development prac-
titioners are concerned about. When economists do engage in the discourse on 
exclusion in development, they typically deal with poverty and deprivation without 
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always applying the basic analytical tools available in economics (Sen 2000; 
Osmani 2003). In this chapter I make an effort to reconstruct the definition of exclu-
sion and its various facets by applying a set of principles that underlie economic 
analyses. Though poverty is not directly dealt with in this paper, it is hoped that a 
concept of exclusion defined within the allegedly ‘narrow’ construct of economics 
can be ‘broad’ enough to encompass real deprivation, and provide additional 
insight into our understanding of the marginality that underlies the poverty observed 
in society.
Concern with exclusion surfaces in several domains of knowledge and related 
discourse appears fragmented, with little meaningful exchange across disciplines. 
A more comprehensive understanding of exclusion can be achieved by applying the 
basic principles of investigation common to various disciplines within economics 
and the social sciences. In the first part of this paper I take a cue from a critique of 
approaches in economics by orienting the discussion on ‘goods and services’ within 
the broader canvass of ‘contracts.’2 In such a setting, I define exclusion as the ‘exclusion 
of an agent from the set of all viable contracts in a given sphere.’
There has been an accumulation of rich experiences from development endeavors 
that have dealt with targeted programs, where the target populations were often 
‘excluded’ groups. Some experiences suggest that there is a plethora of programs 
that suffer from inadequate planning; and there are programs that work for one 
segment of a target group but fail to reach others. Attempts to identify target groups 
and transfer resources or services to them via ‘out-of-system’ approaches have often 
fostered local divisiveness instead of leading to the desired reconfiguration of 
the social groups and reduced exclusion. In order to take the discourse ahead for 
formulating meaningful applicable measures there is a need to find common 
language, to reconstruct our ideas around ‘exclusion’ and to reconstruct the observed 
phenomena and draw inferences from a ‘model-dependent reality’ (in a comparative 
static setting) to guide possible actions.
In the first part of the paper I focus on the reconstruction of basic concepts, and in 
the second part I extend the analysis to classify exclusion, illustrated in the context 
of a service market and conceptualized with supply and demand tools. The exercise 
provides an opportunity to identify various options for reducing exclusion that have 
obvious linkages to familiar development programs and policies. The latter reveals 
that many initiatives to reduce exclusion under the umbrella of safety nets often lead 
to the introduction of differentiated products in segmented markets that may actually 
contribute towards perpetuating differentiations within a population. It is hoped that 
the proposed approach will improve the ability to design programs that effectively 
reduce exclusion (and poverty) as well as to evaluate program performance.3
2 An earlier attempt to conceptualize exclusion (Zohir et al. 2008) used demand and supply tools 
without invoking an underlying ‘system’ with agents, their preferences, and potential exchanges 
amongst agents.
3 The literature recognizes that there are instances of exclusion that exist in the absence of poverty 
and instances of poverty that are not rooted in social exclusion. This discussion on exclusion is 
general and considers exclusion associated with some form of poverty.
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3.2  Conceptual Issues
3.2.1  Exclusion is Not Insurmountable: Rationale  
for the Undertaking
In all development endeavors over the last two decades or more, either in the guise 
of Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
or in initiatives to achieve greater equity and foster inclusive growth, the general 
concern was one of reaching out to those who are ‘left out.’ Earlier concern with 
those who are ‘left-out’ receiving benefits from economic growth or those adversely 
affected by growth processes, gradually shaped pre-defined social and economic 
groups.4 Thus ‘left outs’ could be children not being sent to schools by their parents, 
poor rural women unable to avail themselves of health services or market opportunities, 
people from minority or socially outcast groups who have little or no access to jobs 
and public amenities, and the physically or mentally disabled. I refer to these people 
or social groups as ‘excluded,’ and to the broader subject of study as ‘exclusion.’
There are numerous programs under governments, the private sector, or NGOs, 
to reduce exclusion, some of which are associated with poverty reduction. The fact 
that these programs are often designed based on the assumption that the target 
groups were ‘excluded’ from regular service delivery networks and may become 
‘included’ through specially designed programs, implies that ‘exclusion’ may be 
overcome. There are ample claims of program success, implying the achievement of 
‘inclusion’ of individuals and groups that were formerly ‘excluded.’ Acceptance of 
such rationale renders exclusion less rigid than the perception that exclusion is 
rooted in the static (or slowly changing) framework of culture. This inference from 
development practices provides the key entry point to the reformulation of the 
analytics within a ‘model-dependent realism.’5 Given an initial equilibrium setting, 
exclusion is defined and programs to reduce exclusion are identified by applying 
comparative static economic analyses.
3.2.2  Fragmented Perspective: Reflections  
on Trends in Knowledge Domain
Some question the relevance of abstract economic theory and consider this realm as 
too narrow to apply to broader issues. Some advocate a pluralist pedagogy to expose 
students “to the competing currents of economic thought, e.g., classical, neoclassical, 
4 Social exclusion long preceded current concerns about economic exclusion. However, social 
exclusion may be historically rooted in some economic rationale and concerns about social exclusion 
were boosted because such exclusion is believed to have led to economic exclusion when the pace 
of economic growth broke away from its historical trend.
5 The term ‘model-dependent reality’ is borrowed from Hawking and Mlodinow (2010), although 
modelling has long been in practice among economists. Long imbued in ‘laws,’ scientists are 
increasingly recognizing the need to rely upon ‘model-dependent realism.’
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Keynesian, Marxian and institutionalist” (Stilwell 2006). Development practices 
have also found inroads into pluralist curricula, with gender, the environment, and 
poverty analysis being some of the important ones. All of these are considered 
means of making students aware of the different ways of looking at economic 
processes, problems, and policies. While diversity opens doors to fresh ideas, our 
failure to enrich the core elements of unity often leads to fragmented views, and this 
may often lead to divisiveness.6 In a small way the current exercise on exclusion 
returns to the basics of economics rooted in early political philosophy and recon-
structs the analytics of an overriding concern of development practitioners with the 
hope that some guidelines for action may be derived. The search for common unity 
is justified because ‘exclusion’ is being articulated among diverse disciplines that 
lack adequate means of communication for broader discussion.
3.2.3  Taking a Step Back—A Note on Core Economic 
Principles
Engaging in a detailed assessment of the various perspectives on economics involves 
the challenging tasks of addressing multiple fields of epistemology and the history 
of economic thought, and their roots in early (post European Renaissance) political 
philosophy and economic theory of various ideologies. I use a set of principles 
below that constitute the core of economics.7 These principles are similar to those 
embedded in methods that are deemed necessary for knowledge building in other 
fields of social science.
 1. A basic analytical category or entity called an ‘agent’ is used to represent entities 
such as a social class, households, individuals, communities, governments, or 
political parties, etc. Each agent is assumed to have a pre-defined objective. The 
choice of agents and their objective ‘functions’ (mappings) are related.8
6 Interestingly the earlier broad pluralist ‘political economy’ approach became sub-divided into the 
‘narrower’ subjects of political science, sociology, economics and many more, and did not re-emerge. 
Instead various perspectives articulated in independent model-based abstractions are portrayed as 
split views and are often alleged to be ideologically biased. Such a state may unduly perpetuate 
divisiveness and obstruct the search for unity.
7 Often corollaries, conditional upon a set of ‘if conditions’ and drawn from a core set of principles, 
are perceived as synonymous with the core itself. Such a perception arises due to our failure to 
distinguish between the method of analysis that a discipline applies and the inferences that are 
drawn from the results of applying the method.
8 An agent acts in multiple spaces with multiple objectives and outcomes that are not measurable 
in the same units. Thus ‘mapping’ involves relating outcomes with several objectives and choices 
across those objectives involve trade-offs, which are often reduced into a single ‘objective 
function.’ The choice of agents depends on the purpose of an analysis, however, as in cluster 
analysis and ANOVA (analysis of variance), one would expect the least variation in objectives 
amongst the elements chosen in a given (set of) agents and greater variation (in objectives) across 
different (sets of) agents.
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 2. Agents are considered ‘rational’ only to the extent that their actions are guided 
by the pursuit of (optimizing) some transformed value of their objectives under 
a set of constraints. Actions or decisions made by agents may only be defined 
over the space in which the objective functions are defined.
 3. Exchanges between agents can take place under various structures of power 
relations, but are sustainable only if all parties in the exchange ‘gain’ (strictly 
speaking) from such exchanges.
These economic principles underlie most, if not all, other disciplines in the social 
sciences. Thus in the context of present-day discourse, ‘political economy’ (instead 
of political philosophy) may more appropriately capture the discipline under con-
sideration. These principles are also relevant to the field of chemistry, where there 
are agents in the form of molecules, atoms or sub-atomic particles and chemical 
bondage may be construed as some form of contract between these agents. Scientists 
recognize the need to move beyond ‘scientific determinism’ and the ‘system of laws’ 
to a model-dependent realism that may generate ‘multiple histories’ depending on 
the assumptions made.9
3.2.4  Exchanges, Markets, Contracts, and Goods and Services
Exchanges involve transactions in two or more directions that involve two or more 
agents. The time and space contingent flows of goods and services that define 
exchanges, and the terms and conditions of such exchanges, together constitute 
‘contracts,’ and such contracts are negotiated between various agents at different 
spheres of life. Within the proposed perspective it is obvious that goods and services 
are one aspect of a contract and they are real when they are elements of viable 
contracts. Our constructs of time and space (and often quality) contingent 
commodities accommodate additional dimensions of contracts, and yet all feasible 
elements of a contract are not exhausted.
Contemporary analysis of markets also recognizes the specifics of non-market 
exchanges, blurring the distinctions between market and non-market exchanges. 
Rhee (2010) distinguishes relational exchanges from market exchanges. Yet the “trust, 
friendship, fraternity or solidarity” that defines relational exchanges is also found 
in modern-day market exchanges, making it difficult to distinguish non- market 
from market based exchanges. What may constitute an exchange and what kinds 
of exchanges define markets, are less formally (and less explicitly) articulated in eco-
nomics textbooks. It is no wonder that ‘classical’ economists vying to break away 
to a simpler ground of analytics pondered extensively on such terms as ‘exchange’ 
9 What I am reverting to in this paper is the set of core principles underlying such model-building. 
It is not akin to physicists’ search for a single theory, rather it outlines the basic elements in building 
a theory or method that may generate numerous theories depending on the choice of agents, their 
objective functions, and the power relations within which they negotiate contracts.
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and ‘value’ before settling with ‘goods and services,’ an ex post manifestation of a 
contract, and with a concept of price (financial) that is one of many dimensions of 
that contract. While discussing markets, which is often the starting point for an 
intermediate textbook, the necessity of identifying a priori, the goods and services 
that are being exchanged is realized. However, it is also recognized that all exchanges 
are not market-based and thus the definition that the ‘market is a place where 
exchanges take place’ appears too hollow.
For our purpose ‘market’ is relevant in an ex post analysis only when there are 
predefined goods and services for which there are predefined agents on both sides 
(providers and consumers). While such a category is resorted to in the latter part of 
the paper, the primary focus is on contracts that embody exchanges, be those via 
‘markets’ or not. A more pertinent question relates to the motive behind engaging in 
contracts. What drives agents to negotiate contracts with other agents is embedded 
in their ‘objectives’ and the ‘constraints’ within which those objectives are realized. 
For the purpose of this analysis, I presume that ‘contracts’ and exchanges among 
various agents are driven by self-interest.10 Thus there is no transaction other than as 
exchanges—that is, there is no unidirectional transfer from one agent to another 
without a matching counter-flow.
Historically, discourses on social contracts moved to market-based analyses in 
economics, often at the cost of a broader understanding of the subject. Subsequently 
the shift in focus from market to contracts in the economic discourse provided new 
insights, but largely ran parallel to the market-based analyses with no observable 
attempt to reconcile the two.11 A contract defines the characteristics of the goods or 
services being exchanged between two or more agents. Thus the search for a viable 
contract between two or more agents requires identifying the goods and services 
that may be offered. This approach to address a problem is ex ante in nature and 
much more akin to traditional ‘business models.’12 In contrast, what emerged due to 
the switch to market-based analyses was the dominance of an ex post perspective: 
goods and services are considered predefined and exchanges between providers 
or producers and consumers take place at terms (prices) that ensure net benefits 
10 Consider Marcel Mauss’s (1967) observations on gifts: “…prestations which are in theory voluntary, 
disinterested and spontaneous, but are in fact obligatory and interested. The form usually taken is 
that of the gift generously offered; but the accompanying behaviour is formal pretence and social 
deception, while the transaction itself is based on obligation and economic self-interest.”
11 Brousseau and Glachant (2002) note that “the notion of contract is simultaneously broader in 
scope and more general than the notion of the market.” Quite contrary to this assertion, discussion 
on contracts continues to be empirically pitched within the context of a given market. Clearly the 
two concepts of market are different, but what is more general than a market under one perspective 
may be a specific aspect of a market otherwise.
12 Existing textbook definitions often use the ex post perspective on business models. Investopedia.
com (2011), as well as several other websites on business, define business model as “[t]he plan 
implemented by a company to generate revenue and make a profit from operations. The model 
includes the components and functions of the business, as well as the revenues it generates and 
the expenses it incurs.” Thus the framework used to identify a product or service whose market is 
yet to be established is also an important component of a business model.
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to both parties. Both approaches are considered valid and useful as long as 
their corresponding aspects are recognized and the limitations of singular focus on 
either is acknowledged.
The observed arrangements of ‘contracts’ among multiple agents in multiple 
spheres may be considered as equilibrium outcomes in accordance with the concept 
of (abstract) market equilibrium. Underlying an equilibrium are: the agents included 
in a model, the assumptions related to their objectives, the constraints they face in 
the forms of resource endowments or technology available for production and dis-
tribution (delivery), and the assumptions about power relations amongst the various 
agents.13 More importantly equilibrium may include the exclusion of one or more 
agents from viable contracts, making exclusion an equilibrium outcome. A new 
equilibrium may be established if any of the parameters mentioned above change 
(e.g., introduction of a new agent, innovative mechanisms that reduce cost, changes 
in objective function, etc.). The resulting new equilibrium may reduce exclusion in 
one sphere and increase exclusion in some other sphere. Alternatively viewed, one 
may design programs to change the setting in ways that reduce exclusion of an agent 
in a given sphere.
3.3  Contracts, Goods and Services, and Exclusion
Suppose there are ‘i’ categories of agents in a society, the i-th being identified as Λi 
(i = 1, 2, … i). The simplest case of exclusion arises when there is a provider of a ser-
vice and all but one type of agents avail themselves of the service. That is, contracts 
could be negotiated with all of those agents, but no feasible contract could be defined 
for (or negotiated with) the ‘excluded’ group. Social exclusion may be interpreted 
as exclusion in one space as a result of social contracts in multiple spaces within a 
given power relationship. Thus a ‘socially excluded’ group may have contracts in 
other spheres of the economy. Only in extreme cases of exclusion, where a group is 
alienated by all others, would the excluded group face extinction, or go into complete 
isolation and establish an alternative society, or create conflict for the mainstream 
(causing negative welfare) so that the latter is forced to renegotiate. In all these cases 
there is a set of predefined agents and a power relationship (jointly referred to as a 
‘system’), and exclusion may be defined as the presence of an ‘agent’ who is unable 
to negotiate a viable contract in a given sphere involving other agents in that ‘system.’ 
Below we use an applied research effort to provide a skill development program for 
urban domestic workers who were ‘excluded’ from regular education to illustrate 
the relationships between contracts, goods and services, and exclusion.
The author and several colleagues assessed the prospect of offering a tutoring 
and skill development program for domestic workers in the city of Dhaka. In most 
13 It is quite possible that multiple equilibria exist because the set of viable contracts may be large. 
The options, however, get reduced as the power relationships get more skewed. We consider the 
observed configuration to be a single equilibrium.
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cases the domestic workers are school-age females whose parents were financially 
compelled to send them to work. Normally the work arrangement does not include 
any obligation on the employer to ensure the education of these child workers. It was 
noted, however, that there are employers who are keen to support the education of 
the children working at their homes. However, these desires did not materialize in 
most cases due to the absence of a favorable community environment and the per-
ception among employers that a suitable arrangement could be reached at little or no 
cost arising from frequent travels by the children outside of their workplace. In other 
words, these workers were ‘excluded’ from traditional education means due to 
prevailing contracts among relevant stakeholders. Based on anecdotal evidence it 
was postulated that there were employers who would be willing to pay for tutoring 
their employees and that a contract (a program with a service package) could be 
defined that would reduce exclusion among the working children. The basic framework 
for identifying the feasible contract to reduce exclusion is described below.
There were three important stakeholders relevant for the purpose of the exercise: 
domestic workers, employers, and the committees that manage the affairs of each 
apartment building.14 The variables assigned to the three were ‘w,’ ‘e,’ and ‘c’ respec-
tively. Any resulting program would have to be introduced by a service provider 
(represented by ‘s’). Additional terms can be added to describe other variables, such 
as: the regulatory regime, other actors (drivers, security guards, etc.) in an apartment 
building, and the general environment (law and order situation) in the neighborhood.
While an optimization problem could be used to solve for a possible comparative 
static analysis, for our purposes only the incentive compatibility issues were 
addressed to assess whether the set of viable contracts was null or non-null. This 
allows for remediating the exclusion of domestic workers from some form of educa-
tion. We let ‘Z’ be the vector of the current contract that describes the influence 
of domestic worker variables (work hours, types of activities to be performed, pay-
ment received, holidays available, and mobility), employers’ preferences and costs, 
the state of community variables (facilities available in the apartment building, etc.), 
and service providers (training or class schedule, payments, etc.), which were 
initially set to zeros.15
 
Z w w w e e e c c c s s s
m n o r= ( , , , , , , , , , , , )1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
 
(3.1)
We let Z*0 be the optimal contract prior to the program, and let {Z1} be the set of 
all possible contracts involving a service provider to offer education for the domestic 
workers.16 If Vij = Vi(Zj) is the perceived net benefits of the i-th agent, (i = w, e, c) in 
14 In order to ensure that the number of domestic workers interested in participating in the program 
would be adequate for viable program operations, the focus of the exercise was confined to apart-
ment-based residences only.
15 Note that there are ‘m’ number of variables for domestic workers (w), ‘n’ number of variables for 
employers (e), ‘o’ number of community (c) variables, and ‘t’ number of variables to account for 
service providers (s).
16 Relevant elements in {s}, a subset of {Z1}, will be strictly positive. For example, the number of 
hours spent by domestic workers in tutoring classes will be positive.
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state j (0 and 1), the search for a viable contract with a service provider amounts to 
finding a vector Z*1 such that, Vi(Z*1) ≥ Vi(Z*0), for all i = w, e, and c; and 
Vs(Z*1) = the net returns to the service provider that are ≥ normal profit.17 Note that 
in the vector {s1, s2, sr} (in Z*1) defines the new goods and services whose introduc-
tion has implications for the values of the elements in the Z-vector.
Initial consultations for the purpose of preparing a questionnaire suggested that 
certain aspects of skill development training and education could be offered in ways 
that encourage the employer and community stakeholders to enroll their domestic 
workers. Specifically, stakeholder willingness was responsive to: variation in the 
hours offered for tutoring or training, the age of domestic workers, the venue of 
classes, and the characteristics of the service provider. Proponents of the particular 
experiment believed that once an initial entry point was utilized and the positive 
benefits became apparent to relevant stakeholders, that the exclusion of urban 
domestic workers from education would be reduced at a broader level.
3.4  Types of Exclusion: Illustration with Service  
Demand and Supply
3.4.1  General Setting
The presence of agents with whom no viable contract may be negotiated in a given 
sphere by any other agent is meant to establish the existence of exclusion. The 
search for viable contracts is meant to reduce exclusion. It is however important to 
recognize that exclusion may arise for different reasons, necessitating different 
remedial measures. It is therefore necessary to categorize exclusion accordingly, so 
that programs or actions to reduce exclusion may be appropriately designed. In this 
section I use basic demand supply tools to illustrate the various types and options.
Consider a service ‘x.’ Each individual in a population may consume only one 
unit of x, or none at all.18 Those who consume x are considered ‘included’ and those 
who do not consume x, either voluntarily or involuntarily, are considered ‘excluded.’ 
Without delving into individual optimization leading to a threshold price below 
which one unit of x is availed of by an individual, I directly define a market demand 
function as:
 
D f p c t M z= ( , , , , , );ϕ
 
(3.2)
17 There may be several Z*1 vectors fulfilling the requirement (equivalent to the Ricardian wage-
profit frontier), and the final solution will depend on power relationships and relative access to 
information.
18 Unit demand is assumed to only illustrate the number excluded from a given service and is not 
essential to the central argument of the exercise.
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where:
p = the price received by provider of the service
c = the additional direct costs to the consumers to use the service
t = the indirect cost to consumers (including opportunity cost) for using the service19
M = the income of the household whose members use the service
φ = the information available to clients, which is less than or equal to Ω (symbolizing 
full information)20
z = all other variables (including preference)
The demand function in Eq. 3.2 has the following properties where fi is the first 
derivative of D with regard to the i-th argument in the equation:
if f1 < 0, demand increases as provider reduces price
if f2 < 0, demand increases as consumers pays less additional cost
if f3 < 0, as opportunity cost increases, demand decreases
if f4 > 0, demand increases with increase in income (this may reverse beyond a point)
f5 may be positive or negative depending on whether inadequate information lessens 
or increases demand. We assume it to be positive on the presumption that increases 
in awareness increase demand for the program services.
To identify the various types of exclusion, we assumed z to be given in all illustra-
tions. I consider the population size to be ‘N’ and assume that each individual is eligi-
ble to buy only one unit of the service under consideration. A total of five broad cases 
are illustrated, the first three deal with choice-based (voluntary) exclusion, although the 
third is structurally imposed and cannot be strictly considered voluntary.
3.4.2  Types of Exclusion
Type 1: choice-based or voluntary exclusion. Prices received by suppliers in the 
main market are equal to those paid by end consumers and unlimited supply is 
ensured at zero price (see Fig. 3.1).21 This implies that p = c = t = 0. I also assume full 
information (φ = Ω) and that M can take any positive value. Therefore D = N1 ≤ N 
where N1 is the maximum number that may avail the service if all other factors are 
(extremely) favorable and voluntary exclusion = E1 = N – N1.
Type 2: exclusion due to a lack of awareness. Inadequate information about the benefits 
from a service (e.g., education) would imply lower effective demand, increasing the 
number of people excluded. This is also a case of voluntary exclusion, but rather as a 
result of inadequate awareness. Formally, if p = c = t = 0, φ < Ω and M can take any posi-
tive value, then D = N2 ≤ N1 and exclusion is described as E2 = N1 – N2 (see Fig. 3.1).
19 Prices of all other commodities have not been included, some of which could be considered 
under t. For the substitutes of the service under consideration the relation would be opposite.
20 Misinformation could be deliberately added, which would further complicate the relationship.
21 The first three cases assume zero costs for ease of illustration. A positive equilibrium price could be 
assumed as well, however, that would call for adjustments on account of the changed values of φ and t.
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Type 3: exclusion for survival (compelled to remain excluded). The consumption of 
certain goods and services that a society generally perceives as normal may be con-
sidered a luxury by people who are at the brink of survival. These people, engaged 
in extremely low-earning jobs if employed at all, cannot afford the time or resources 
to consume the services, even when offered at zero prices. I differentiate this from 
voluntary exclusion, since the choice is ‘structurally imposed’ by initial ownership 
of endowments. If p = c = 0; φ = φ (N2), t > 0 and M can take finite positive value, 
then D = N3 < N2 and E3 = N2 – N3 (see Fig. 3.1).
Type 4: exclusion due to the lack of effective demand under positive prices. If one 
could control for all the three types of exclusion discussed above, all forms of social 
exclusion and those arising out of costly connectivity (discussed later), we would be 
left with the possibility of exclusion as a result of a lack of effective demand. This 
case is illustrated in Fig. 3.2 and assumes that prices received by main market 
suppliers are equal to those paid by end consumers. Of those agents (consumers) 
with positive effective demand at non-negative prices, (q1 q2) are unable to avail 
themselves of the service at a market price of P0.
Type 5: exclusion caused by ‘distance’; (5A) social exclusion, and (5B) poor con-
nectivity/ delivery system (or other factors). While the previous four types of 
exclusion are fairly straightforward, lumping together ‘social exclusion’ with exclu-
sion caused by physical distance (from growth centers) and/or the lack of appropri-
ate or efficient delivery mechanisms may be controversial. Reducing the concepts of 
exclusion (including that of social exclusion) to tractable cost equivalence is not meant 
to undermine the importance of the processes that generate exclusion. It is impor-
tant to note that the subject of exclusion is also of interest to development practitio-
ners because they believe that exclusion may be reversed and that there are costs 
involved for all such efforts towards inclusion. The equivalence of the two types of 
exclusion may be argued on the grounds that both arise due to ‘distance,’ one in 
social space and the other in physical space. Thus from a purely technical perspec-









Note: All demand curves assume
a given level of income (M>0).
Fig. 3.1 Three types of 
exclusion under zero price  
to borrowers
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no different from the cost of the ‘delivery’ to a consumer in a distant market. In both 
cases an excluded person would have to pay in addition to the ‘normal’ price and the 
latter critically depends on the delivery system in place.
The horizontal supply line Se in Fig. 3.2 is meant to represent socially excluded 
(SE) people under the assumptions of delivery at zero price and the effective demand 
of socially excluded persons are represented by the lowest segment of the demand 
curve. There is an interesting twist to the story in this particular case. When SE 
people are represented by the lower end of the demand curve, market forces (supply- 
side agents) may be less keen on changing the status quo and they would even be 
less keen if inclusion of the SE has negative effects on the willingness to pay at the 
upper end of the curve. Clearly increases in resource endowments of cash, assets, or 
intellectual capital among SEs will change the distribution of SE along the demand 
curve and market forces may be more eager to remove social exclusion.22
A more general case is presented in Fig. 3.3 where I assume that c > 0 (c = P0—P), 
meaning that consumers have to pay an additional price to avail themselves of a 
service compared to a general (mainstream) consumer. With c = 0 (zero distance 
cost), equilibrium price and quantity would be P0 and q0 respectively. If c > 0 and all 
buyers have to pay the additional price (captured by a demand curve D1 to the left), 
q0—q1 would get excluded and receipt by a provider (P1) would be less than 
payments made by the consumer (P3). Innovations in service delivery, improved 
connectivity reducing delivery cost, and/or wider acceptance of the formerly 
excluded social groups would all push the S curve downward (or shift the D1 curve 








Fig. 3.2 Exclusion due to 
lack of effective demand
22 A case in hand is the Dalit in India, a group of people considered ‘untouchables’ or ‘outcastes.’ 
This paper does not illustrate the case of labor markets, where market returns on investments in 
skill development of an otherwise ‘excluded’ group may be shown to be higher.
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3.4.3  Ways to Reduce Exclusion
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 make evident the kinds of shifts in demand and supply curves 
that may reduce exclusion of the six types discussed earlier. Sources of such shifts 
are rooted in various kinds of policies and changes in the market environment. 
A summary of options to reduce various kinds of exclusion are summarized in 
Fig. 3.4. If exclusion is voluntary the urge to reduce exclusion may be justified if the 
social benefits from inclusion are perceived to be higher than the costs perceived by 
private individuals opting for exclusion. In such cases individual action may be 
influenced either by motivating changes in the objective function of excluded agents 
or by providing incentives (if the cost of the latter is less than the perceived net 
social benefits). Similarly the second and third types of exclusion may be addressed 
by promoting awareness through networks and by addressing competing factors 
respectively (e.g., excusing school-age children from daily household chores).
Options are rather limited in the first three cases since it is only possible to 
address the demand side. In the last three cases options are open from both the 
demand and supply sides, as well as through innovations that reduce supply cost—
through costs of production, delivery, or both. A comprehensive list of interventions 
is provided in Fig. 3.4.
3.5  Exclusion and Segmentation
Since multiple intervention choices exist for the last three types of exclusion, it is 
pertinent to discuss appropriate selection criteria. Traditionally we are introduced to 
two basic interrelated criteria that are also used for assessing program performance 
or efficiency: the cost of reducing exclusion and the efficacy of targeting. While these 
are important, the obvious implications of targeted programs for creating differentiated 










P Reduction in exclusion is
associated with shifts in D and S
along the directions indicated
by the arrows
Fig. 3.3 Exclusion caused 
by ‘distance’
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As noted earlier the current availability of goods and services subsumes a balance 
between agents with existing contracts (included) and agents with whom no 
viable contract could be negotiated (excluded). Any attempt to expand service 
coverage beyond a market-determined level calls for new contracts to be negotiated. 
In this case the corresponding goods and services may no longer be considered iden-
tical to the old ones. Several cases are discussed below to illustrate this situation.
The case of a perfectly discriminating monopoly is well-known amongst econo-
mists. In this scenario no new product is introduced, but the market is segmented 
to ensure greater profit to a monopolist, which also leads to the reduction of exclusion 
(in contrast to a competitive solution). Without reductions in the cost of producing 
or delivering a given good or service, coverage may be expanded (exclusion reduced) 
by introducing new goods and services of lower quality at lower cost.23 Sometimes 
funds may be provided to extend an ‘existing’ product or service (e.g., primary 
education or sanitary toilets) to a targeted (excluded) population through a new con-















































































































































































2. Lack of awareness
4. Market exclusion/lack of effective demand
5A. Receipt < payment—social exclusion
5B. Receipt < payment—poor connectivity, etc.
3. Exclusion for survival/competing factors
Fig. 3.4 Ways to reduce exclusion
23 There is ample anecdotal evidence of this in markets, such as: housing services, apparel, all kinds 
of food, education, and health (most basic necessities).
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and a corresponding product or service, the targeted program is more likely to give 
rise to a new contract and a service or product that is not same as the one originally 
meant to be delivered!
Figure 3.4 presents nine interventions with potentials to reduce exclusion. The 
implications of these interventions for segmentation were described in Figs. 3.1, 
3.2, and 3.3, where solutions were sought beyond ‘market-determined’ terms of 
exchange. Those are recast with explicit emphasis on segmentation and summarily 
presented in Table 3.1 above. At the practitioner level there is uncertainty about 
whether efforts towards inclusion can ever be completed. Or stated alternatively, 
does product differentiation introduced to ‘include’ subsequently lead to further 
segmentation? At the level of analysts and program evaluators a program may be 
fine-tuned (or have its performance assessed) on the basis of its degree of neutrality 
to or biases towards product differentiation and segmentation.
3.6  Concluding Observation
The inquiry into exclusion I pursued in this paper presumed that exclusion can be 
reduced, but ended by showing that there is a cost to most such attempts by way of 
introducing segmentation into the economy and society. The discord between textbook 
teaching of economics and development practices, further distorted by un- scrutinized 
inclusion of development issues into teaching, was one concern that led to this 
paper. The search for a set of core principles underlying various disciplines within 
‘political economy’ was justified on the ground that ‘exclusion’ is being dealt with 
within those disciplines (breeding fragmented perspectives). Once these principles 
were laid out the rest of the paper followed the tradition of deductive reasoning.
Table 3.1 Implications of various interventions on segmentations
Intervention type Implication
Innovation reducing production cost (1) Inclusive in nature, no segmentation
Price subsidy (2) If applied to all, inclusive: targeting requires 
segmentation
Innovation introducing differentiated 
product (3)
Segments, which may be irreversible in the short- to 
medium-term and may percolate into other 
spheres
Innovation in delivery that reduces cost  
of delivery (4)
Reduces segmentation
Improve connectivity/reduce distance (5) Reduces segmentation
Promote/avail services of agencies with 
network capital (6)
If governed properly, reduces cost of delivery and 
therefore reduces segmentation
Social awareness (7) If rightly pitched, reduces social differences
Increase income/transfers (8) If accompanied by reduced inequality, reduces 
segmentation
Address competing factors (9) Reduces segmentation
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Contracts embody exchanges that involve reciprocal transactions and are assumed 
to be driven by self-interest. This paper considered contracts to arise between various 
agents in a society in multiple economic and noneconomic spheres, and defined 
exclusion as the presence of one or more agents with whom viable contracts cannot 
be defined. ‘Contract’ as an analytical category was perceived more suitable a tool 
for ex ante analysis, whereas ‘goods and services,’ identified as elements of viable 
contracts, provide the basis for ex post analysis. Both routes of analysis were pursued 
in this paper to gain better insights into exclusion and for the design and assessment 
of programs to reduce exclusion. Although the subject was raised, this paper did not 
delve into the role of agencies (formal manifestation of agents above micro-levels) 
in introducing new forms of contracts. Nor did we pursue the arguments for identi-
fying the areas of unity among various sub-branches of knowledge, particularly in 
economics, that are alleged to be ideologically tainted. It is hoped that the perspec-
tives proposed in this paper will open avenues for such discourse in future.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
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